United States District Court, D. Colorado
JOSEPH J. GOMEZ, Plaintiff,
KROLL FACTUAL DATA, INC., Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification ("Motion"). (ECF No. 90.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
On September 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. (ECF No. 1.) On February 20, 2013, the case was transferred to this Court. ( Id. )
On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendant, brought on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. (ECF No. 15) On November 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (the "SAC Motion"), which contained a new class definition (the "SAC Class"). (ECF No. 54.) On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Class Certification on the class definition contained in the Amended Complaint (the "Class Certification Motion"). (ECF No. 58.)
On March 27, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff's SAC Motion (ECF No. 75), and Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") later that day (ECF No. 76). On April 14, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion, and explained that it considered the SAC Class in its ruling. (ECF No. 78.)
On April 17, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the Class Allegations and Claims from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (the "Motion to Strike") (ECF No. 79), which the Court granted in part on May 28, 2014 (ECF No. 89).
On June 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (ECF No. 90.) Defendant submitted its Opposition to the Motion on July 2, 2014 (ECF No. 97), and Plaintiff filed his Reply on July 28, 2014 (ECF No. 99). On July 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Cite Supplemental Authority for Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 102), which the Court granted on July 31, 2014 (ECF No. 103).
District Courts have broad discretion to reconsider their interlocutory rulings before the entry of judgment. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[D]istrict courts generally remain free to reconsider their earlier interlocutory orders."). Thus, a court can alter its interlocutory orders even where the more stringent requirements applicable to a motion to alter or amend a final judgment under Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) are not satisfied. See Laird v. Stilwill, 982 F.Supp. 1345, 1353-54 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
"Notwithstanding the district court's broad discretion to alter its interlocutory orders, the motion to reconsider is not at the disposal of parties who want to rehash old arguments.'" National Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim Williamson Prods., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2000) (quoting Young v. Murphy, 161 F.R.D. 61, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). "Rather, as a practical matter, to succeed in a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Id. Even under this lower standard, "[a] motion to reconsider should be denied unless it clearly demonstrates manifest error of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence." Id.
In support of his Motion,  Plaintiff has submitted evidence and case law that he believes warrants reconsideration. The Court will discuss each of Plaintiff's submitted materials in turn.
First, Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of Erich C. Ferrari, Esq., an expert in economic government sanctions (the "Declaration"). (ECF No. 91-1.) Plaintiff argues that this Declaration is "new evidence" that should cause the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. (ECF No. 91 at 3.) The availability of new evidence that was previously unavailable is an appropriate ground upon which to seek reconsideration. Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). The Declaration was signed on June 5, 2014, one month after the Court denied Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion and eight months after the deadline for designating rebuttal experts and the exchange of rebuttal expert reports had passed. (ECF Nos. 50, 91-1.)
Plaintiff argues that his delay in submitting the Declaration is justified because the Court did not allow Plaintiff to brief certification of the SAC Class. (ECF No. 91 at 13.) The Court, however, has already addressed this argument in its Order Granting in Part Defendant's Motion to Strike, explaining that the Court "considered the newly defined class when denying the Class Certification Motion." (ECF No. 89 at 3 (citing ECF No. 78 at 2-3).) ...