United States District Court, D. Colorado
BRONWYN K. PARENT, Plaintiff,
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant
For Bronwyn K. Parent, Plaintiff: Michael W. Seckar, LEAD ATTORNEY, Rachael Adair Lundy, Michael W. Seckar, P.C., Pueblo, CO.
For Carolyn W. Colvin, Defendant: J. Benedict Garcia, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. Attorney's Office-Denver, Denver, CO; Allan D. Berger, Christina J. Valerio, Sandra Thourot Krider, Social Security Administration-Denver, Office of the General Counsel, Region VIII, Denver, CO.
ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER
Robert E. Blackburn, United States District Judge.
The matter before me is plaintiff's Complaint [#1], filed March 25, 2013, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. I have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter has been fully briefed, obviating the need for oral argument. I affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled as a result of an affective disorder, a personality disorder, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and keratoconus. After her applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits were denied, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. This hearing was held on August 15, 2011. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 33 years old. She has high school education and past relevant work experience as a cashier, fast food worker, bagger, and demonstrator. She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 23, 2009, her alleged date of onset.
The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income benefits. Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffered from severe impairments, the ALJ concluded that the severity of those impairments did not meet or equal any impairment listed in the social security regulations. The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work with certain postural and non-exertional restrictions. Although this finding precluded plaintiff's past relevant work, the ALJ determined that there were other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national and local economies that she could perform. He therefore found plaintiff not disabled at step 5 of the sequential evaluation. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council. The Council affirmed. Plaintiff then filed this action in federal court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if her physical and/or mental impairments preclude her from performing both her previous work and any other " substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). " When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the impairments in making a disability determination." Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the claimant's condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining ...