Arapahoe County District Court No. 98CR1522. Honorable Kurt A. Horton, Judge.
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Ned R. Jaeckle, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Bernard and Navarro, JJ., concur.
[¶1] Defendant, Mark Fritz, appeals the denial after a hearing of his Crim. P. 35(a) and (c) motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his sentence respectively. We dismiss this appeal as moot.
[¶2] In 1998, Fritz was accused of sexually abusing his adopted daughter, J.F. The prosecution charged him with seven counts of sexual assault and three counts of aggravated incest.
[¶3] Fritz admitted to sexually abusing J.F. more than a thousand times over a three-year period. He pleaded guilty to aggravated incest, and the prosecution dropped the remaining charges.
[¶4] Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the trial court sentenced Fritz to sixteen years in prison plus five years of mandatory parole, which the court agreed to suspend on the condition that Fritz complete twenty years of probation and sex offense specific treatment.
[¶5] Fritz complied with the plea agreement until 2008, when he left Colorado without permission and travelled to the Philippines. The prosecution filed a complaint seeking to revoke his probation. Fritz was arrested in the Philippines and extradited to the United States.
[¶6] He then filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a Crim. P. 35(c) motion to vacate an allegedly illegal sentence and conviction. He contended that a person convicted of a sexual offense between July 1, 1996, and November 1, 1998, as here, is subject to a period of discretionary parole that may not exceed " the remainder of the maximum sentence of incarceration imposed by the court." See § 17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S. 2013; People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 349 (Colo. 2001). Therefore, he argued, he should not have been sentenced to five years of mandatory parole and that this parole period was illegal because " the real basis of the plea could have been up to sixteen years of parole as determined by the Parole Board." Because the parole period was ...