United States District Court, D. Colorado
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT LEGAL INSTITUTE, and ROD LUECK, Plaintiffs,
JOSHUA EPEL, JAMES TARPEY, and PAMELA PATTON, in their official capacities as Commissioners of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Defendants, and ENVIRONMENT COLORADO, CONSERVATION COLORADO EDUCATION FUND, SIERRA CLUB, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, and INTERWEST ENERGY ALLIANCE, Intervenor-Defendants,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' EARLY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS & INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS' EARLY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, District Judge.
This action challenges the constitutionality of Colorado's Renewable Energy Standard statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124. In this case's current posture, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the provision requiring that Colorado utility companies obtain an increasing proportion of their electricity from renewable sources violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. (Sec. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 163) pp. 40-45.)
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Early Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Motion") (ECF No. 180); and (2) Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants' Early Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims 1 and 2 ("Defendants' Motion") (ECF No. 186). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion is denied and Defendants' Motion is granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987).
A fact is "material" if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable party could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. Houston v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Energy and Environment Legal Institute ("EELI") is a non-profit organization which describes itself as being dedicated to the advancement of rational, free-market solutions to land, energy, and environmental challenges in the United States. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) EELI also promotes coal energy, and believes that the impact human activities have had on the rise in global temperatures is an open question. (ECF No. 188 ¶ 3; ECF No. 194-1.) Plaintiff Rod Lueck is a member of EELI who resides in Colorado. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Defendants Joshua Epel, James Tarpey, and Pamela Patton are members of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. ( Id. ¶¶ 6-8.) The Intervenor-Defendants are various non-profit organizations devoted to preserving the environment or promoting renewable energy resources and industries. ( See, ECF Nos. 21 & 73-75.) For purposes of this Order, the Court's reference to "Defendants" includes the named Defendants and the Intervenor-Defendants.
In 2004, Colorado voters passed Amendment 37, which was intended to promote the development and utilization of renewable energy resources. ( Id. ¶ 60.) Amendment 37 was codified in 2005 as the Renewable Energy Standard statute (the "RES") at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124. Although Plaintiffs originally challenged other aspects of the RES, at this point in the case, the only remaining claims assert that Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-2-124(1)(c)(I), (V), (V.5) and 40-2-124(3), (4), and their implementing regulations codified at 4 Colo. Code Regs. §§ 723-3 et seq. (together, the "Renewables Quota"), violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. ( Id. ¶¶ 137-51.)
The Renewables Quota requires each retail utility to generate, or cause to be generated, renewable energy resources in specified minimum amounts. ( Id. ¶¶ 137-141.) As originally formulated, the Renewables Quota required certain Colorado electric utilities to provide 10% of their retail electricity sales from renewable sources by 2015. (ECF No. 186-1 at 23.) Since the RES was adopted, the Colorado Legislature has amended the statute three times to increase the Renewables Quota and to add different kinds of electricity generation entities.
As it currently stands, the Renewables Quota includes three distinct requirements depending on the type and size of electric utility. By 2020, investor-owned utilities such as Xcel must obtain 30% of their retail electricity sales from renewable sources. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124(1)(C)(I)(E). Cooperative electric associations serving 100, 000 or more utility meters must obtain sufficient renewable energy to supply 20% of their electricity by 2020. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(V.5). Cooperative associations serving fewer than 100, 000 utility meters, as well as large municipal utilities, must obtain 10% of their retail sales from renewable sources by 2020. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(V)(D).
The RES allows utilities to meet their Renewables Quota by either generating or buying renewable power directly, or by purchasing renewable energy credits. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124(1)(d). The RES defines the types of energy that can be credited towards a utility's Renewables Quota, and includes certain types of both recycled energy and energy generated from renewable sources. Id. § 40-2-104(1)(a). Recycled energy is energy captured from the heat from exhaust stacks or pipes that would otherwise be lost, and which does not combust additional fossil fuel. Id. § 40-2-104(1)(a)(VI). The RES's definition of renewable energy resources includes solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and hydroelectricity with certain restrictions. Id. § 40-2-104(1)(a)(VII).
The RES and its implementing regulations also create a system of tradable renewable energy credits that may be used by a utility to fulfil its Renewables Quota. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-1-104(1)(d). For a Colorado utility to use renewable energy (or renewable energy credits) towards its Renewables Quota, it must seek approval from Colorado's Public Utility Commission. 4 Colo. Code Regs. § 723-3-3656. Certain utilities must also submit to the Public Utilities Commission a plan detailing how they intend to comply with the Renewables Quota, including estimates of the amount of renewable energy that will be generated by various sources. Id. § 723-3-3657. An approved plan carries a rebuttable presumption that the utility is acting with prudence. Id. § 723-3-3657(c).
In April 2011, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging six aspects of the then-existing statutory scheme. (ECF No. 1.) The case was stayed pending resolution of jurisdictional and immunity issues. (ECF No. 46.) Defendants moved to dismiss this action, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims. (ECF Nos. 28 & 37.) The Court granted in part and denied in part those motions, dismissing all claims brought against the State of Colorado, Defendants John Hickenlooper and Barbara Kelley, and all monetary claims against the Defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 64.) The Court found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts to show that they had standing to survive the Motion to Dismiss as to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief brought against the members of the Public Utilities Commission in their official capacities, as well as Plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages brought against these Defendants in their individual capacities. ( Id. ) Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their claim for damages under § 1983. (ECF No. 70.)
After these rulings the stay was lifted and the case proceeded to discovery. (ECF Nos. 65 & 149.) In 2013, the Colorado Legislature passed significant revisions to the RES that impacted Plaintiffs' claims. See A Bill for An Act Concerning Measures to Increase Colorado's Renewable Energy Standard so as to Encourage the Deployment of Methane Capture Technologies, S.B. 13-252 (69th Gen. Assembly 2013). In response to these changes, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint which brings six claims challenging three aspects of the RES. (ECF No. 163.) The Second Amended Complaint is the operative pleading for this case.
Near the close of discovery, Plaintiffs filed their Early Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment in their favor on all claims. (ECF No. 180.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their Early Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which seeks judgment in their favor on claims 1 and 2, which relate to the Renewables Quota. (ECF No. 186). These motions are fully briefed and are presently before the Court.
At the same time, Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment renewing their argument that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims. (ECF No. 188.) The Court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue claims 3-6, but that they had established standing to pursue claims 1 and 2. (ECF No. 219.) The dismissal of claims 3-6 moots significant portions of the ...