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decided: April 29, 1985.



Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of Court, in which all other Members joined, except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Author: Marshall

[ 471 U.S. Page 345]

 JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question here is whether the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that took place before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.


The case arises out of a formal investigation by petitioner Commodity Futures Trading Commission to determine whether Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), or persons associated with that firm, violated the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. CDCB was a discount commodity brokerage house registered with the Commission, pursuant to 7 U. S. C. § 6d(1), as a futures commission merchant. On October 27, 1980, the Commission filed a complaint against CDCB in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging violations of the Act. That same day, respondent Frank McGhee, acting as sole director and officer of CDCB, entered into a consent decree with the Commission, which provided for the appointment of a receiver and for the receiver to file a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code). The District Court appointed John K. Notz, Jr., as receiver.

Notz then filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on behalf of CDCB. He sought relief under Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for the

[ 471 U.S. Page 346]

     liquidation of bankrupt commodity brokers. 11 U. S. C. §§ 761-766. The Bankruptcy Court appointed Notz as interim trustee and, later, as permanent trustee.

As part of its investigation of CDCB, the Commission served a subpoena duces tecum upon CDCB's former counsel, respondent Gary Weintraub. The Commission sought Weintraub's testimony about various CDCB matters, including suspected misappropriation of customer funds by CDCB's officers and employees, and other fraudulent activities. Weintraub appeared for his deposition and responded to numerous inquiries but refused to answer 23 questions, asserting CDCB's attorney-client privilege. The Commission then moved to compel answers to those questions. It argued that Weintraub's assertion of the attorney-client privilege was inappropriate because the privilege could not be used to "thwart legitimate access to information sought in an administrative investigation." App. 44.

Even though the Commission argued in its motion that the matters on which Weintraub refused to testify were not protected by CDCB's attorney-client privilege, it also asked Notz to waive that privilege. In a letter to Notz, the Commission maintained that CDCB's former officers, directors, and employees no longer had the authority to assert the privilege. According to the Commission, that power was vested in Notz as the then-interim trustee. Id., at 47-48. In response to the Commission's request, Notz waived "any interest I have in the attorney/client privilege possessed by that debtor for any communications or information occurring or arising on or before October 27, 1980" -- the date of Notz' appointment as receiver. Id ., at 49.

On April 26, 1982, a United States Magistrate ordered Weintraub to testify. The Magistrate found that Weintraub had the power to assert CDCB's privilege. He added, however, that Notz was "successor in interest of all assets, rights and privileges of CDCB, including the attorney/client privilege at issue herein," and that Notz' waiver was therefore valid. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a-20a. The District Court

[ 471 U.S. Page 347]

     upheld the Magistrate's order on June 9. Id., at 18a. Thereafter, Frank McGhee and his brother, respondent Andrew McGhee, intervened and argued that Notz could not validly waive the privilege over their objection. Record, Doc. No. 49, p. 7.*fn1 The District Court rejected this argument and, on July 27, entered a new order requiring Weintraub to testify without asserting an attorney-client privilege on behalf of CDCB. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.*fn2

The McGhees appealed from the District Court's order of July 27 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 722 F.2d 338 (1984). It held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The court recognized that two other Circuits had addressed the question and had come to the opposite conclusion. See In re O. P. M. Leasing Services, Inc., 670 F.2d 383 (CA2 1982); Citibank, N. A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (CA8 1981).*fn3 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 469 U.S. 929 (1984). We now reverse the Court of Appeals.

[ 471 U.S. Page 348]


It is by now well established, and undisputed by the parties to this case, that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Both for corporations and individuals, the attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice. See, e. g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, supra, at 389; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).

The administration of the attorney-client privilege in the case of corporations, however, presents special problems. As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation. In Upjohn Co., we considered whether the privilege covers only communications between counsel and top management, and decided that, under certain circumstances, communications between counsel and lower-level employees are also covered. Here, we face the related question of which corporate actors are empowered to waive the corporation's privilege.

The parties in this case agree that, for solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors.*fn4 The managers, of

[ 471 U.S. Page 349]

     course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves as individuals. See, e. g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N. W. 668, 684 (1919).

The parties also agree that when control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well. New managers installed as a result of a takeover, merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications made by former officers and directors. Displaced managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers, even as to statements that the former might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate duties. See Brief for Petitioner 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See generally In re O. P. M. Leasing Services, Inc., supra, at 386; ...

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