CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
O'connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), the Court held that a pretrial denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable prior to trial under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 as a final collateral order. The Court reserved the questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial denials of disqualification motions in criminal cases and of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases. Id., at 372, n. 8. We decide today that a District Court's pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
Petitioners are four police officers who formed a "grandpop" decoy squad in the Philadelphia Police Department. Petitioner Flanagan would pose as an aged derelict, a likely target for street criminals. When Flanagan gave the standard alarm, the other members of the decoy team would move in to make an arrest.
A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted petitioners in September 1981. The indictment alleged that petitioners had conspired to make arrests without probable cause and had unlawfully arrested and abused eight people. One count of the indictment charged petitioners with conspiring to deprive citizens of their civil rights in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 241. The remaining 12 counts charged petitioners, in various combinations, with committing substantive civil rights offenses in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 242.
Prior to the return of the indictment, petitioners had retained the law firm of Sprague and Rubenstone to act as joint counsel. Petitioners decided to continue the joint representation after the indictment was handed down, even though the indictment did not make the same allegations against all petitioners. Petitioners Keweshan, Landis, and McNamee, however, moved to sever their case from petitioner Flanagan's, arguing that the Government's evidence against Flanagan alone was so much greater than the evidence against them that severance was necessary to avoid prejudicial spillover. In addition, based on the asserted differences in their involvement in the activities alleged in the substantive counts of the indictment, petitioners moved to dismiss the conspiracy count. The Government responded by moving to disqualify Sprague and Rubenstone from its multiple representation of petitioners and by asking the court to inquire into the representation as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c).*fn1
In early December 1981, following a hearing and briefing on the Government's motion, the District Court disqualified the law firm from participation in the case. The court found that no actual conflict of interest had yet developed but that there was a clear potential for conflict. Most notably, the severance motion and supporting papers showed that petitioner Flanagan's interests were likely to diverge from the other petitioners' interests. The District Court also found that petitioners had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived their right to conflict-free representation. The court concluded, however, that it had the authority and, indeed, the obligation under Rule 44(c) to disqualify counsel when "the likelihood is great that a potential conflict may escalate into an actual conflict." 527 F.Supp. 902, 909 (ED Pa. 1981). The court presumed that Sprague and Rubenstone had obtained privileged information from each of the petitioners and therefore disqualified the law firm from representing any of them.
Petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the District Court in June 1982. 679 F.2d 1072. Although jurisdiction was not challenged, the Court of Appeals noted that it had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 because the disqualification order was appealable prior to trial as a collateral order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The court went on to hold that the disqualification order was proper because an actual conflict of interest was very likely to arise. In July 1982 the court denied rehearing but stayed issuance of the mandate to permit filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.
Petitioners filed their petition in September 1982, one year after the grand jury had returned the indictment against them. They contended that disqualification of counsel of their choice after they had knowingly waived conflict-free representation deprived them of their Sixth ...