ISSUES PRESENTED
The parties were unable to agree upon the wording of the factual issues in the submitted pretrial order. Our review of the evidence presented at trial, the numerous pleadings, and the briefs of the parties filed leads to the conclusion that the following outlined issues of fact and law satisfactorily delineate the areas of contention among the parties. These issues as set out will govern the order of disposition of the three suits in this opinion.
Issues of Law
Because the defendants reserved certain issues relating to the jurisdiction of the Court, these will be disposed of first. The first four issues of law may be considered the jurisdictional issues presented.
1. Do the plaintiffs have standing to sue?
2. Is there a justiciable controversy entitling plaintiffs to declaratory relief?
3. Are the plaintiffs' actions unconsented suits against the United States?
4. Are the plaintiffs seeking review of and an injunction against discretionary acts of the AEC which are not subject to judicial review?
5. Is the AEC following its Congressional mandate and its own rules and regulations in that the actions and plans for protecting health and minimizing danger to life and property are a reasonable exercise of its statutory authority?
6. Are the plaintiffs entitled to an order directing the AEC to answer all questions and to turn over to the plaintiffs all information regarding Project Rulison?
Issues of Fact
The ultimate issue of fact presented by these cases is whether the proposed flaring of gas from the Rulison cavity will endanger life, health and property of the plaintiffs or any other similarly situated, in contravention of the mandate of the Atomic Energy Act. In determining this issue, five subsidiary issues have been raised by the parties and must be disposed of. These are:
1. Do the Rulison plans make reasonably adequate provision for the protection of the health and safety of human, plant and animal life?
2. Are these plans for flaring within the radiation protection standards of the AEC and the Federal Radiation Council (FRC)?
3. Are the defendants prepared and equipped to actually implement the plans for flaring, thus insuring the protection of health and safety?
4. Are there safe economical alternatives to the proposed flaring as a means of determining the effectiveness of the Rulison detonation?
5. Are the FRC and AEC radiation protection standards themselves reasonably adequate to protect life, health and property?
ISSUES OF LAW
1. Standing
Contrary to the assertion of defendant Seaborg in his brief filed August 25, 1969 that Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968) is not pertinent to the issues presented by the complaint in this case, the Court believes that Flast is more pertinent than Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923) (relied upon by the defendant). Flast should be the starting point of an analysis of the issue of standing. Although both Flast and Frothingham deal with the specific problem of a taxpayer's standing to challenge federal spending, Flast is the most recent comprehensive discussion by the Supreme Court of the general problem of standing.
The Frothingham line of cases holds that a plaintiff must allege that he suffers a direct injury to some legally protected interest in order to have standing. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the standing requirement because their claims are predicated upon their residency in Colorado alone. The plaintiffs' status as citizens subjects them to the hazards complained of, but defendants contend that because they are in no different position from other citizens who may be subjected to the pollution claimed, they have no standing to sue. The essence of the argument is that the plaintiffs fail to assert substantial injury to their own legally protected interest.
A clarification of the concept of standing is found in the Flast opinion prior to the discussion of the specific problem of taxpayer standing. Then Chief Justice Warren stated that the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III embodies two limitations on the federal judiciary. One is the requirement of an adversary context before the courts will act and the other is the separation of powers among the three coordinate branches of the federal government. He noted that "justiciability" is the term of art utilized to express this dual limitation and that there are various grounds on which questions have been held not to be justiciable in the federal courts. Standing to sue is one of these grounds.
The Flast analysis of standing reveals that the doctrine primarily implements the requirement of an adversary context for the operation of the federal judiciary in the resolution of a dispute. In order to insure the adversary context, a determination of standing initially focuses on the party rather than on the issues presented. Thus, if the party alleges a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy which will insure sufficient adverseness to adequately present the issues, resolution of the dispute will not be impeded because the case is hypothetical or an abstraction. If the personal interest is found to be sufficient, the next step is to look to the substantive issue presented to determine whether a logical nexus exists between the status asserted and the claim. 392 U.S. at 102, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947.
This nexus appears to us to be the connection between the official action challenged and a legally protected interest required in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S. Ct. 1843, 23 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1969), quoted in defendant Seaborg's brief. In other words, we believe that the standing doctrine requires that these plaintiffs first show a satisfactory interest entitled to legal protection and then show that this particular interest is in some way threatened with sufficient logical directness by the action of defendants to insure that there will in fact be presented to the Court a concrete controversy by adverse interests.
Under this test, it is clear that all of the plaintiffs in Civil Action C-1702 have standing to challenge the action of defendant Seaborg as Chairman of the AEC. Charles Morgan Smith, Crowther and Eames have alleged the ownership of property in the proximity of the Project Rulison site, and each has alleged occasional residence on his property. It is alleged that James Hopkins Smith accompanies his father to the property owned by the elder Smith. These allegations have not been contradicted by defendant Seaborg nor any other defendants. These plaintiffs allege that the Project and the planned flaring of gas will add a sufficient amount of radioactive particles to the atmosphere to create a direct threat to their health, welfare and safety.
These allegations constitute a substantial assertion of a personal stake in the controversy. Plaintiffs assert that they are so situated that the contemplated action of defendants in flaring presents a threat to their health and safety. We need cite no authority for the proposition that the law protects the interest of persons in their health and safety. We also think that the logical connection between the "status" of plaintiffs as property owners, and occasional residents in the proximity of the Rulison site, and the "threat" to their health and safety affords a sufficient basis for an actual controversy.
Any distinction between the standing of the plaintiffs in C-1702 and the plaintiff in C-1712 must be based upon the fact that the latter, COSCC, is a public benefit corporation bringing a class action on behalf of all persons entitled to the protection of their health and the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of Colorado. We find no significant problem presented by the fact that plaintiff COSCC is a corporate entity seeking to assert the interests of its incorporators and the public for whose benefit it was formed. In the specific area of civil rights, the Supreme Court has recognized the standing of the N.A.A.C.P. to assert on behalf of its members their legally protected rights. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958). Other cases have likewise held in several areas that responsible and representative groups have standing to assert the public interest. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941, 86 S. Ct. 1462, 16 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1966); Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (1966); Nashville I-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921, 88 S. Ct. 857, 19 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1968).
Furthermore, there is another rationale available for sustaining the assertion for standing of the plaintiffs in both C-1702 and C-1712. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial review of agency action. The statutory provision for the right of review is 5 U.S.C.A. ? 702:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
In determining whether the APA does provide for judicial review of Project Rulison at the instance of these plaintiffs, several questions must be answered. First, is this a suit against Dr. Seaborg, or is it in fact one against an agency of the federal government, the AEC? Second, if this is a suit against the AEC, does 5 U.S.C.A. ? 702 apply to the AEC under the Atomic Energy Act? Third, if in fact ? 702 does apply to the AEC, is the challenged project "agency action"? Fourth, are the plaintiffs in Civil Actions C-1702 and C-1712 persons "adversely affected" or "aggrieved"? Fifth, are the plaintiffs persons adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute?
The initial question of whether the suit filed against Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is one against Dr. Seaborg, the AEC, or the United States is one of the most troublesome presented by the case. The answer to this question goes not only to whether the APA is applicable, but also goes to the question of sovereign immunity. Ignoring for the present time the issue of immunity, it is helpful to consider why the action is so captioned. Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Seaborg, in his official capacity as Chairman of the AEC, is operating beyond the limits of his statutory authority. They seek to enjoin him from so acting. The AEC as such is not acting, but rather its executive officer is acting through his subordinates. In order to effectively terminate this alleged action beyond the scope of authority, the judicial action sought must be directed against the acting party.
There are numerous cases dealing with the issue of sovereign immunity that hold that a suit against a public officer is in fact a suit against the government if the relief sought will operate against the government, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 687, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 93 L. Ed. 1628 (1949). Thus, a nebulous characterization has often been utilized to denominate one action to be against the officer, another against the sovereign. Of course, the characterization depends upon the factual setting of the case, and in many, if not most, the distinction is clear. In a case such as that presented here, however, the clarity is diminished by conceptual problems. Here the plaintiffs seek to enjoin Glenn Seaborg from acting in his capacity as Chairman of the AEC. The action they wish to enjoin is the culmination of activity by the agency he directs, the AEC, over a period of several years in the planning and execution of Project Rulison. The reality is that this is the action of the agency, in common language, which plaintiffs would have this Court stop. The further reality is that this agency of the federal government is acting for that government.
However, the problem of who is sued apparently has not troubled the Supreme Court in the two most recent and most significant cases dealing with the review provisions of the APA. Neither Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967), nor Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S. Ct. 787, 7 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1962), concerned themselves with the question we have here posed. Both held that the review provisions of the APA were applicable in suits which denominated the agency head as party defendant. Therefore, we find that with respect to the applicability of the APA, it is unnecessary to fully answer the first question, since the answer seems to be that this is a suit against all three entities. We also find that the APA is applicable to suits which denominate Glenn Seaborg as Chairman of the AEC the party defendant, if all other conditions precedent are satisfied.
In determining whether 5 U.S.C.A. ? 702 applies to the AEC under the Atomic Energy Act, the starting point for analysis is 5 U.S.C.A. ? 559. Section 559 states that the judicial review provisions of the APA cannot be superseded or modified by subsequent legislation except to the extent that such subsequent legislation does so expressly. The Atomic Energy Act does not expressly supersede the APA, but rather makes it expressly applicable to all AEC "agency action", and expressly modifies the APA with two provisos. 42 U.S.C.A. ? 2231 states that the APA is applicable to all AEC "agency action", with the proviso that in actions involving restricted data or defense information the AEC shall provide for procedures which parallel those of the APA, in order to effectively safeguard or prevent disclosure. The other proviso is 42 U.S.C.A. ? 2239 which expressly modifies the provisions of the APA with respect to procedures for the licensing of production and utilization facilities, procedures for dealing with licensees, and procedures for dealing with patents under the Act. Review of proceedings under ? 2239 is by a United States Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. ? 2342.
42 U.S.C.A. ? 2231 provides that the term "agency action" for the purposes of review of the AEC shall have the meaning specified in the APA. Thus, having answered the second question posed in the affirmative, finding that the APA does apply to the AEC, we must determine if the action challenged is "agency action" within the APA. The statutory definition is found in 5 U.S.C.A. ? 551(13):
"agency action" includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.
Definition of the terms "rule", "order", "license", "sanction" and "relief" are also found in ? 551. None of these forms of "agency action" except "order" has application to this case. ? 551(6) states:
"order" means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing;